











# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

ARMED FORCES AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
IN THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

by

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September 1983

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Armed Forces and National Development,  
in the Case of the Republic of Korea

by

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## ABSTRACT

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The military, as a modern institution, has significantly contributed to the development of the Republic of Korea. This study is a documentation of the role of the armed forces and the contribution of the armed forces as a part of national development.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION .....	7
II.	BACKGROUND AND METHOD OF STUDY .....	10
III.	NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT .....	13
IV.	GROWTH OF THE MILITARY .....	16
V.	THE MILITARY AS A MODERN INSTITUTION .....	21
	A. INSTITUTION-BUILDING PERIOD .....	21
	B. INSTITUTION-STRENGTHENING PERIOD .....	23
	C. INSTITUTION-PERFORMING PERIOD .....	24
VI.	THE ROLE OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT .....	27
	A. CIVIC ACTION AREA .....	28
	B. TECHNOLOGY AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA .....	31
	C. MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA .....	34
	D. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT .....	35
VII.	CONCLUSION .....	38
	A. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE .....	39
	APPENDIX A: CIVIC ACTION AREA .....	43
	APPENDIX B: TECHNOLOGY AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA .....	54
	APPENDIX C: MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA .....	57
	APPENDIX D: ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT .....	61
	LIST OF REFERENCES .....	66
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	68





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## I. INTRODUCTION

In many of the nation-states born shortly after the end of the Second World War, the military has played central roles in nation-building and, in fact, has symbolized the independence of their nations. As such, the military in these developing states has provided the primary impetus for modernization and development while also striving to create internal harmony. Military intervention in politics has been a general trend in the developing nations in the 1960's.

In cases of military intervention in national politics and as agents of societal change, military forces have a mixed record.

In Indonesia the officer corps looms as one of the major sources of political power and administrative capacity in the country. Since their takeover in 1955, the Indonesian military has filled a vacuum of political and bureaucratic tradition left by the Dutch withdrawal in 1949. Since the military was not created by an old-established state, nor by a strong monolithic party, Indonesia's armed forces were never completely subjected to strong political or governmental control. The very fact of its subsequent and continuous involvement in the struggle for power, combined with its heterogenous military and ideological background, forced the Indonesian officer corps into a difficult and





often inefficient role. Moral deterioration and material corruption have resulted. Despite an immensely large population and a wealth of natural resources, today Indonesia is still struggling to overcome serious societal and developmental problems.

In Burma, prior to the spring of 1958, the civilian government was factionalized and beginning to crumble. Various groups within the ruling party had created autonomous power bases and a falling out among top leaders of the party threatened to result in the disintegration of every important institution in the land. Only the Army remained united. Its intervention and seizure of power in 1958 probably saved the nation from collapse, even before the military government was formed and much more so afterward. The Burmese Army manifested entrepreneurial traits over a wide range of activities, from the economic sphere to the political and to a lesser extent to the educational and socialization spheres. There was a marked improvement in efficiency in public administration. Authority also became far more regulated and predictable. This is not to say that the Burmese model is one of absolute success. Conflicting ideological considerations and special interests continue to hinder modernization.

It is difficult, in any developing society with military leadership, to precisely evaluate the success or failure of



military efforts at national modernization and development. The case of the Republic of Korea is no exception.

The Korean Armed Forces were a longed-for-dream during the 36 years of Japanese colonial domination and, as such, embodied the hope for independence and national sovereignty.

From the beginning the Korean Armed Forces had to overcome a serious clash of ideologies in the form of the Korean War, 1950-1953, and had to participate in politics from the 1960's--providing the impetus for progress and the modernization that followed. Subsequent participation in the Vietnam War significantly improved the capability of the armed forces and earned them status as one of the finest military machines in the world.

The primary mission of any national military force is to provide for the national security. If necessary, such forces must be prepared to wage successful battle. In modern society, however, the military often has a secondary, but still vital, role--that of contributing to national development. This trend of dual missions is clearly evidenced in Korea.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the extent to which the military of the Republic of Korea has contributed to national development.





## II. BACKGROUND AND METHOD OF STUDY

Military sociology has achieved new importance after World War Two. Armed forces began to be viewed as symbols of independence, as institutions that helped build national states, and as an interest group of great significance.

The military intervention in politics induced numerous studies which evaluated the military organization as more than management of small power groups [Ref. 1]. Military sociology considers the military organization as a subgroup of a society and studies its mutual, dynamic relationships with diverse organizations. It is possible therefore to study the social, economic and educational aspects of the military organization as well as its military and political side. The reason this kind of situation came about was that the social change brought to economic development and modernization in the developing countries evidently emerged all over the world. The developing countries wanted a rapid modernization plan. The military organization was the most available structure and therefore attention was concentrated on this organization [Ref. 2].

Another reason was that the military organizations of the developing countries were patterned after the military organizations of the most developed countries. This meant that the armed forces of developing countries were influenced



by the modern military technology of Western nations. Thus the Armed Forces of developing countries were very sensitive towards the development of rapid industrial technology. This situation improved the similarity between the military organizations and civilian organizations and the possibility of interrelationships between soldiers and civilians.

In order to evaluate this process in the Republic of Korea, this paper is oriented in the following manner.

First, a concept of Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea describes the military organization which was founded as a modern form. This paper is not a strictly comparative study nor a disciplined attempt at hypothesis testing. Furthermore, the role of the military organization itself is management of power and defense of states and so there is no way to confirm clearly a relationship of the economic and cultural development of the nation. The military organization itself is a consumer's group and during peacetime it becomes one of the necessary consumers. Therefore we can't evaluate its productivity or efficiency.

This paper confirms the contribution of the military organization to development in a roundabout way. It confirms how much the Armed Forces contributed to the national development by using the method of specific illustration not through hypothesis testing or comparative methods.



A major problem is that there are limited resources which describe the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea's contribution to the national development. The Armed Forces have made major contributions in two categories: One is as an educational institution, the other is as a propulsion modernization institution. This paper deals only with the category of "propulsion institution" as part of modernization.





### III. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

National development is a multi-dimensional concept and its complexity has proven perplexing to many observers and scholars. There is little consensus on a single specific definition of national development, however, writers have proposed various ideas that are useful in understanding the concept of national development. According to Tsurutani, national development is "the attainment of a certain desired state of affairs for man and society" [Ref. 3]. This includes "a politically, socially and economically integrated society with built-in capacities for continuous adaptation and growth, and regularized process and methods for the resolution of conflict and the generation of change" [Ref. 4].

Robert P. Clark discusses "human dignity" as an overarching concept that "reflects the specific mixture of values of power, well-being, respect and enlightenment characteristics of any given culture or subculture" [Ref. 5]. "In my view," furthermore, he states, "human dignity carries with it the notion that each person is to be considered an end in himself or herself, and not a mere instrument to enhance the values of some 'higher' entity, for example, the state, a party, or a dictator" [Ref. 6].



Or, according to Heady, "In essence, the distinctive quality of the development ideology is the agreement on the desirability of the joint goals of nation-building and national progress combined with a sense of movement toward fulfillment of a long-delayed, destiny, underlying which is a nagging uncertainty concerning the prospects for eventual success" [Ref. 7].

In essence nation means people, a group of individuals sharing a common history, tradition and culture [Ref. 3]. Development refers to socio-demographic, structural, and value changes from traditional to modern. It also refers to the capacity to adjust to a new situation. Above all, however, it connotes promotion of the people's welfare. In other words, development means the people lead a better life than they did before. Many observers and practitioners, however, have differed on the meaning of "a better life". For years, scholars from different fields have studied this problem with none being able to compile a list of universal human values precisely and with enough empirical rigor for scientific investigation [Ref. 9].

Nations differ. No two peoples have an identical value system. Colonial people desire liberation; dependent people, independence; people without freedom, freedom; the hungry, food; the cold, warmth; the uneducated, education; and those leading a harsh life, comfort. The list is indeed endless.



What do the Korean people desire most then? In other words, this paper is an investigation of the military's contributions to the achievement and satisfaction of the aspirations of the Korean people.





#### IV. GROWTH OF THE MILITARY

The liberation from the Japanese colonial rule in 1945 found Korea divided both physically and emotionally. The division of the country along the 38th parallel was a catastrophe whose deadly significance took some time for the people to grasp fully. The Korean nation was not consulted at all in the decision. It was an externally imposed decision dictated by the military expedience of the occupying powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The purpose of the military occupation of Korea by the two powers was to disarm the Japanese troops in Korea and repatriate all the Japanese back to Japan as a preliminary to restoring political independence to Korea. The ensuing Cold War froze the national division. This in turn became a direct cause of the Korean War of 1950.

The Korean people wanted to have their land unified and an independent democratic republic established. Instead, two separate governments were established. The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) in the South and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) in the North. Each was sponsored by its occupying power. The Korea War (1950-53) was a tragic war triggered by a North Korean attempt to unify the country by force. No unification followed. Instead, the war left in its wake a country totally destroyed.



Founded on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea in the south suffered the trauma of an infant republic. A new government was established for some 20 million people with little resources at its disposal. The limited number of developmental infrastructures left behind by Japan were destroyed during the Korean War. Independence was, however, welcome and euphoria was generated for a promising future. Setting high ideals, the 1948 constitution of the republic stated that the people of Korea were determined:

to consolidate national unity through justice, humanity and fraternity;

to establish a democratic system of government eliminating evil social customs of all kinds;

to afford equal opportunities to every person and to provide for the fullest development of the capacity of each individual in all the fields of political, economic, social and cultural life;

to require each person to discharge his duties and responsibilities;

to promote the welfare of the people at home and to strive to maintain permanent international peace and thereby to ensure the security, liberty and happiness of ourselves and posterity eternally ... [Ref. 10].

The government of the First Republic was, however, overthrown by a massive student uprising in April, 1960. The immediate cause of the uprising was a rigged election in March of that year with President Rhee of the First Republic and his Liberal Party attempting to stay in power at any cost. The student uprisings were spontaneous at the outset but the older people soon joined them. The Rhee regime had



been suffering from much negative criticism from the citizens. According to one study at the time, the students and the general public seemed to agree that President Rhee was too old and had been in power too long, that there was too much corruption in government, that the economy had been suffering from stagnation and depression and that there were too many profiteers in and out of government [Ref. 11].

Following the 1960 student uprisings, political instability was compounded. Students were considered to be heroes and they agitated for greater political inputs. Although it took seriously lessons from the failure of the Rhee government's autocratic rule, the Second Republic of the Democratic Party was too weak and inexperienced to practice a working democracy. Authority was lacking in the political process. The ruling party was divided between old and new guards [Ref. 12]. Even in the military, junior officers were promoting purification drives against senior officers. The Second Republic lasted less than a year. On May 16, 1961, a small group of South Korea's powerful armed forces seized power in an almost bloodless revolution, uprooting the uncertain democratic experiment of the Second Republic [Ref. 13]. The revolution took place on the 16th of May. The next day, the military junta of 30 men, comprised primarily of generals and colonels and headed by General Park Chung Hee took charge of national affairs. They permanently





dissolved the National Assembly and prohibited all political activities, organized and unorganized alike. The same day, this revolutionary committee announced their public pledges for revolution, emphasizing a stronger anti-Communist stand, a stronger tie with the United States, a strong effort to eradicate all corruption and social evils and further create a fresh morale with a view of rejuvenating the demoralized national spirit and a concerted effort to establish a self-supporting economy.

The 1961 revolution brought the military into the mainstream of South Korean politics and national development. During the junta period, the first five-year economic development plan was announced. The junta period lasted until December 1963. Earlier, the junta announced that at any time upon completion of the afore-stated mission, we will turn over the control of government to clean, conscientious civilians and will return to our proper duties.

Turning over the control of government to civilians did not necessarily mean that the junta would return to the barracks. General Park, as the leader of the junta, became the standard-bearer of the junta-created Democratic Republican Party and ran successfully for president of the Third Republic. Many in the junta and other military personnel took off their uniforms and ran for the national assembly or served in the government. What really emerged in



this process was a close alliance between the civilian government and the military, as well as a propagation of military values in national policy making and administration [Ref. 14].



## V. THE MILITARY AS A MODERN INSTITUTION

The Korean military is a post-World War Two product. When Korea was liberated from Japanese rule in 1945, there was not a Korean military which could be considered a modern military. What military the traditional Confucian state of Yi maintained had been disbanded by Japan when the latter annexed Korea in 1910. Thereafter, Japan taught the samurai (traditional Japanese warrior) virtues to the Korean people but refused to arm them. Only during the Second World War did Japan start drafting Korean students and recruiting Korean volunteers to fight its war in China and throughout the Pacific. There were some Korean independence fighters in Manchuria and China, but there was no organized Korean military.

The modernized Korean military went through three stages of development in the context of its origin, tradition, professionalism, and contribution. These stages are: (a) Institution-building, (b) Institution-strengthening, and (c) Institution-performing.

### A. INSTITUTION-BUILDING PERIOD

Initial stage--military institution-building--occurred during 1945-1950. There were many different military establishments with different origins, combat experience and with



different political ideology. The leading military figures were former graduates of the imperial Japanese Military Academy or former Japanese officers. Some were former Manchurian Army officers or officers in the Nationalist Chinese Army. Some others still were former independence fighters or power-brokers who stayed on operating in Korea under the Japanese. As a result, the creation of a unified and orderly military system was nearly impossible [Ref. 15].

Futhermore, due to the liberal policy of the U.S. military which occupied the Southern part of Korea and a lack of cohesive leadership among various strata of Korean people, approximately 30 military organizations reported to the U.S. Military Government in November, 1945, all of which intended to play a role in maintaining national security and order after post-Japanese colonialism. The specific direction and goals of each of the more than 30 military organizations were different and the lack of coordination led initially to confusion. The issues developed around different political ideologies and views stressing from capitalistic democratic thought versus Communism, and competing claims of purity as anti-Japanese independence movements.

Nevertheless, these various military origins were eventually united into a single, official military organization; that is, the Korean Constabulary reserve under the Bureau of Armed Forces of the Department of National





Defense, the U.S. Military Government in Korea. The office of the Director of National Defense and the Korean Constabulary reserve were established on November 13, 1945, and January 15, 1946, respectively [Ref. 16].

The Korean Constabulary Reserve included Coast Guard forces but not Air Reserve forces. The Office of National Defense began to train an officer corps to strengthen reserve forces as in the American military system. In line with this, the Military Language School was inaugurated in December 5, 1945; its mission was to teach English as well as American military culture to Korean officers, most of whom were former Japanese, Chinese, or exiled Korean military officers.

#### B. INSTITUTION-STRENGTHENING PERIOD

While the major skeleton of the Korean military structure was completed, ideological training and military professionalism were not integrated yet. This was done during the second stage of the Korean military development, namely the military institution-strengthening period. The strengthening period of the Korean military began from the Korean War in June 1950 and lasted up until the military revolution on May 16, 1961.

During the war and soon thereafter the size of the Korean military was increased several-fold to some 600,000 men. The transfer of technology, weapons, logistic support, and



financial aid for the development of a strong Korean military also became a primary U.S. goal.

This period provided challenges to the Korean military as it worked to integrate a unitary national identity into a free capitalistic democratic system by eliminating Communist Army officers and soldiers, on the one hand, and on the other hand by acquiring experience in the Korean War during which it suffered 180,000 casualties [Ref. 17].

If institution-building refers to the matter of integration and control, and institution-strengthening defines the process of developing group identity and loyalty, certainly the Korean military took advantage of the opportunity to solidify their national identity and to acquire modern military tactics and strategy through its participation in the joint tactical command system with the United States, Great Britain, France, Turkey and other participant countries under the U.N. flag.

It was in this period that, for the first time in Korean military history, the Western code of military professionalism and civil-military relations was instilled, although ambiguously conceptualized.

#### C. INSTITUTION-PERFORMING PERIOD

The third stage of the Korean military development--the institution-performing process--occurred from 1961 up to the 1980's. During this period the Army began to perform with



increasing effectiveness, and develop new organizations and new military strategies.

The Army was tested through numerous sporadic military clashes and small combat engagements in sweeping infiltrating Communist guerrilla forces as well as the Vietnam War. The Korean military forces suffered 15,922 casualties in the Vietnam War, while hundreds of thousands of soldiers acquired combat experience which is, in fact, a significant deterrance to war between North and South Korea [Ref. 18].

As Lucian Pye, among others, has maintained, the military, in the context of third world development, is the most modern and easily created organization [Ref. 19]. Once created, the military in developing nations can initiate a modern role in a non-modern environment. As a modern organization, furthermore, the military becomes more aware of the need for change than other sectors of the society, and it often becomes, itself, an agent of modernization.

The military as a modern institution, according to Morris Janowitz, possesses modern skills, weapons and equipment [Ref. 20]. It also enjoys a relatively disciplined and cohesive organization. Its modernistic values also include scientific planning, work efficiency and effectiveness, control and measurement, record keeping and briefing. In addition, specialization, accountability and responsibility are emphasized. A strong sense of duty and honor is also





regarded as a high military virtue. The military's access to international communications and its role as the defender of national sovereignty make it also a highly nationalist group [Ref. 21].

In the context of development, the military often stands as the most modern institution. In Korea, its enormous size, dictated by Cold War considerations and maintained by American aid, has made it the most powerful and best organized group within society, capable of imparting modern values to the still traditional milieu. Through its conscription and recruitment practices, it is in contact with the people at the grass-roots level. Men from every village are drafted into the military service, and later discharged back into the society at the rate of 200,000 per year. During their stint in the military, these men learn to handle and operate modern equipment, and to relate in new ways to new forms of organization. Furthermore, they come into contact with urban life and become geographically mobile [Ref. 22].

During this period, the Korean military has not only strengthened its military power for national security but enhanced its role in modernizing Korean society in such a manner that the military contributes personnel, equipment, oil, rice, cement, tents, wood and bus services in the areas of construction, education, agriculture, health and social welfare.



## VI. THE ROLE OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

During the 1960's and 1970's, Korea has made enormous strides towards economic development. These activities have been carefully directed according to guidance provided in four successive five-year economic development plans which have required both skilled and manual workers. These workers have been made available from the ranks of retired veterans.

The Korean military has also trained numerous personnel in its professional technical schools such as engineering, communications, air navigation, maintenance, transportation, chemicals and accounting. This highly specialized manpower has been in great demand throughout the rapidly growing industrial sector.

These well-disciplined and technically trained military retirees are now working as major productive forces in every sector of industry, including some key industrial enterprises. For example, 74.2% of the manpower of the Hyundai Construction Company have a military background, while Daewoo Heavy Mechanical Company in the Incheon area and Samsung Electrical Engineering Company have drawn 70.7% and 33.4% of their total employees from retired military personnel [Ref. 23].

It is very common for "active participant" construction and heavy machine products enterprises operating outside of



Korea to rely greatly on personnel discharged from the military.

During the third stage--military institution-performing--the civilian government was forced to apply military planning techniques to their administrative work. In the early days, following the 1961 military revolution, this development caused uneasiness among the civilian bureaucracy. However, the military planning concept has evolved since then along the lines of the McNamara Planning--Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) and Management By Objective theories (MBO). These systems have been adapted and utilized in every segment of the Korean government. Each department of government has an office of planning and management immediately under the vice minister. This office coordinates and controls every bureau through budgeting and management evaluation.

Lucian Pye has stated that the Army, as a modern organization and modernizing agent, can make contributions to strengthening essential administrative functions and raise standards in the realm of public administration [Ref. 24]. Clearly, this has been the case in South Korea.

#### A. CIVIC ACTION AREA

Among many diverse roles played by the Korean Armed Forces in national development, that of civic action has been vital and ongoing.



The military has rendered immense services to the civilian sector in the areas of road construction, restoration of disaster areas, volunteer services to agriculture, public sanitation and technical assistance. Through these support activities, the military's advanced techniques and know-how were transmitted to the civilian sector.

As the table entitled "Civic Support Actions" indicates, the military has provided significant civic support in the areas of construction, education, agriculture, health and social activities and social welfare, actively mobilizing many soldiers and equipment. Over 1,585,020 troops were mobilized in addition to various kinds of equipment such as trucks, cranes, compressors, bulldozers, and even naval vessels. Necessary resources required for civic support including gasoline, medical facilities, grains, and other materials were also supplied. The Civic Support Action of the Army shows the evidence of thorough and inspired efforts of the military towards civic support. A particular event worth notice among the military's civic support efforts was the swift restoration work performed by mobilized military forces after Typhoon Sarah hit Kyungbuk and Chunnam province in 1959.

The civic support of the engineer corps mainly centers around road construction, building, and restoration work. Its superior capability in these areas was demonstrated by





the completion construction on the dangerous and difficult parts of the highway reaching 31.1 km between Seoul and Pusan. Fully utilizing its competence and capabilities, the engineer corps has contributed to enhancement of the civil military relationship and development of the nation. Today the engineer corps continues to carry out its mission, faithfully pursuing road expansion, and bridge construction.

In 1959, with the support of the United States Operations Mission (USCOM), Korean and U.S. Armed Forces jointly constructed manoeuvre roads which served to interlink strategically critical points. Efforts were also extended to the areas of social welfare and construction of sport areas, schools, apartments, orphanages, and public assistance institutions. Activities were not limited to Korean projects. During the period of November 1965 to December 1967, the missions of road construction and bridge construction were successfully accomplished in Vietnam.

The Air Force and the Army Air Force have also been active in civic support, making significant contributions to life-saving operations in times of flood, fire, traffic accidents, and mine accidents.

The Navy has played an active part in saving victims of sea disaster along Korean coasts and has been active in the marine resource excavation program which requires highly advanced and technical military assistance. On the sea



transportation side, the Navy is also quite active in transportation of resources and manpower to various locations. In 1969 the Navy implemented the "Nakdo Public Relations Program." Under this program, benefits and services such as medical treatments, movies, photograph shows, and invitations of remote island children to Seoul were provided to local residents.

#### B. TECHNOLOGY AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA

There have been other contributions, more apparent and conventional in nature, made by the military to Korea's national development. Needed technology and manpower in rapid industrial and economic development were largely supplied by the military.

Most of the Third World nations tend to equip their military with modern and advanced weapons and allocate vast resources to the training, education, and technological development. Such functions are usually performed by the military technology institution. The ROK Army, which obtains necessary training and education through systematic 221 MOS (Military Occupation Specialties) in 16 schools, could maintain close relationships with the civic sector and play a decisive role in industrialization.

Korean military technology institutions, modeled after the U.S. military, were founded immediately after establishment of the ROK Armed Forces. In this early period,



schools involved with various specialties and technologies such as combat intelligence and communications were organized. Following that, a supply school, medical school, infantry school, administration school, adjutant school, armoured school, transportation school, chemical school, and army air school were gradually established.

Each school has trained young men in valuable technical areas. Everyone was required to master at least once skill during his service. Recent research indicates about 40% of these young men are now using their newly acquired skills to earn a living in the civilian sector.

The level of the military technology, however, has been lagging behind civilian technology since the 1970's. This phenomena can be explained by the fact that the military technology institutions have focused their development efforts on technological areas needed in combat situations while neglecting technological development for general industrialization. Such a trend, however, does entail positive results as the military concentrates on development of specialized technologies where the civic sector is not willing to invest in light of low investment return and fund shortages. In other words, the military technology institution focuses its research on technology and intelligence development needed in the military, and at the same time they have to search for ways to activate technology





interchange with the civic sector by specializing on areas neglected by the civic sector.

Technology and manpower produced by the military technology institutions are quite impressive; by 1965, 571,938 technicians in 454 curriculums were produced throughout the vastly diversified and specialized spheres of machinery, construction, communication, electricity, electronics, physics, chemistry, transportation, navigation, aviation, and meteorology. Efforts to develop further specialized technicians were made in vehicle maintenance, ordinance maintenance, compressor machine, mechanical machine, airplane maintenance, and special weapon repairs.

During the period 1975-81 the portion of licensed technicians who acquired qualification during their service reached 18% of total licensed technicians in automobile repairs and maintenance field, 25% in hazardous material handling, and 14% of electricity technicians.

To aid former soldiers in using their newly obtained skills in the civilian job market, the military conducted the occupational information education program. Necessary manpower required in the Second Five Year Economic Development Plan which had been promoted on a national scale since July 1967 was also allocated. This program was a part of the social welfare promotion policy for retired soldiers.



### C. MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA

Numerous medical officers and nurses were trained during the Korean War. Since 1952, the military also has aggressively promoted both domestic and foreign education in order to develop medical specialists capable of performing in such medical areas as military surgery, dentistry, nursing, and medical administration. Returning to the civic sector after conscription, these trained professionals have been utilized to satisfy manpower demands in the civic sector.

Another important contribution includes progressive research and development activities and accumulation of medical skills. In March 1952, with the establishment of the First Nerves Surgery Department, the military made a significant contribution to development of the brain-nerves area of medical science in Korea. Today it is equipped with the most advanced research facilities in the sphere of cerebral hemorrhage in the world.

The Marine Medical Science Research Center, which is a unique institution in Korea, illustrates the military's expertise in medical science. Medical problems involved with underwater development, primarily the prevention and treatment of underwater accidents, are studied at this research center.

The Aerial Medical Science Research Center, founded in 1952, is the only aerial medical institution in Korea with



modern facilities such as introspection training facilities and a cultivation accelerator. This center takes responsibility for health care for aerial members. It also provides services of physical examination and medical examination to pilots and crews of civilian airline companies. High pressure oxygen treatment and heart transmission measurement are highly valued capabilities of this facility.

The military also established the medical equipment corps which is essential in medical facility education, and is at the head of manufacturing medical tissues and eye glasses. Clearly the Korean military has made significant contributions to the development of medical science and medical capability in the civilian sector.

#### D. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Armed Forces have been effective in the field of enhancement of language skills and development of administrative and management capabilities.

Language skills in English, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Thai, German, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese have been actively cultivated for the purpose of translation and interpretation. Benefits of language education offered in the military have also been extended to the civilian sector where specialized knowledge in language is demanded. The number of interpreters in active service increased dramatically after



the establishment of the ROK-US combined forces command and the initiation of ROK-US combined military exercises.

In order to develop administrative manpower techniques of general administration, personal administration, manpower management, and adjutant skills were taught in curriculums offered to officers after 1951. Typing (Korean and English) and shorthand courses were offered to non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. Curriculums offering accountant, management, leadership, and planning training were offered to generate superior manpower among the ranks.

The military forces have provided educational service to civilians including public officers, police, national defense members, and military drill instructors. In return, selected military officers were sent to civilian universities. The scope of education of the Armed Forces was not limited at home. Numerous officers went abroad to study advanced management techniques and various technological subjects.

Such elaborated efforts exerted to develop high-quality manpower can be seen in the occupational distribution of retired generals. Taking the leading part in each area, they are spread throughout government institutions, public enterprises, education circles, and other important fields.

A final area of military service to the civilian administrative sector involves the legal profession. Qualified prosecutors, lawyers, judges and other legal staff





demande d in the civic sector were largely trained and supplied through the military's judge advocate program.



## VII. CONCLUSION

Clearly, the military forces of the Republic of Korea have contributed immeasurably to the modernization and development of the nation. This paper has illustrated several ways in which these contributions have occurred. The training of skilled manpower in technological, industrial, and administrative areas and the subsequent return of this manpower to the civilian sector has been a vital contribution to development. It is very doubtful that such trained personnel could have been produced as effectively or in as great numbers as was done by the military. The second way in which the military has contributed involves the conduct of various types of technological and medical research. In this manner the military has compensated for the lack of and weakness of comparable civilian research institutions. The third category of services provided by the military has been that of direct aid to the civilian community. Construction projects and disaster relief operations have been at the head of such efforts.

The greatest contribution, however, has been that which is a common mission to all military services throughout the world--national security. In the case of South Korea, this mission is especially vital. The nation is faced by a proven and sworn enemy who controls the fifth largest military force



in the world--North Korea. To counter this threat, the R.O.K. Military has evolved into a modern, powerful and ever vigilant protector. Behind this military shield, a secure and peaceful environment conducive to national development has been provided for three decades.

#### A. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Despite the immense services rendered to the Korean nation by the military, the time has come to re-evaluate its role in society. Of paramount importance is the intervention of the military in political affairs. In the past, the military has intervened only in times of civilian political importance or instability. While such actions have been viewed by many as essential to the survival of the Republic, many frictions and political problems have resulted.

With the rapid advances in technological skills and organization, and given the increasingly complex interrelationships between the various sectors and strata of the society in general, it is time to reconsider the future of civil-military relations.

In essence, the answer to what the new form of civil-military relations must be has to take into account the unique factors influencing Korean society. It must address the question of how far and how much the military should involve itself into the civil sectors of society.



History is important in that regard. Korea was formed as a democratic nation, accepting the role of a frontline state against Communism. As such, the Korean military has to maintain a disciplined ideology of anti-Communism and stability. At the same time, the Army as well as the nation itself, faces the aggressive threats of North Korea. The failure of detente has impressed upon the Korean people the volatility of international politics while making us aware of the need for our self-defense and even greater autonomy and growth as an independent and self-sufficient actor in global relations. Since liberation, the concepts of freedom and democracy have taken firm root in our people and our social system. The spread of capitalism and the resultant economic growth and welfare can be expected to continue.

Then, what should be the optimal state of future civil-military relations?

I can define two states. One is that of maintaining the system and creating a basis for growth. In other words, the military must continue to provide the shield behind which a timely democratic process can take place.

The other is the military acting as an interest group itself within the larger political milieu. This requires that the society be a mature political system while also requiring the military to be more flexible in meeting opposing views. The military would exercise its influence in





a legitimate and mature manner in such a system. For a country such as Korea, in a process of political growth, the responsible political participation of the military is of paramount importance.

In a different respect, but also of great significance, is the problem of communication. In a military composed of all strata of society, as is the case of the Korean military, and imbued with the same ideology and values as the civilian population, and sharing the same purpose and goals, there still is a communications and understanding gap between the military and the civilian population. This phenomenon is more the result of differing interests rather than indifference or disapproval. Therefore, the military must undertake efforts to better public relations and increase awareness of what it does. At the same time, the military can assist in many projects to aid the civilian population. With these efforts, it is believed that the communications gap will be closed and smoother relations gained.

In Korea, the military and the civilian population share many common factors. Both aspire to identical goals of peace and freedom. Despite this commonality, there is the need to create greater harmony and cooperation.

In this regard, the military must stress greater professionalization to raise the general level of its capability while also striving to foster better



communications with the civilian sector. By doing so, the military will strengthen its ability to deter aggression from outside, while enhancing democracy and social development at home. A more professional and capable military with greater responsibility and maturity will leave a greatly improved impression on the civilian population.

In a nation such as Korea, harmonious relations between the military and the civilian population, a relationship characterized by understanding and cooperation, is necessary for continued national growth and development. It is also one of the most important tasks facing us in the future.



# APPENDIX A

## CIVIC ACTION AREA

TABLE A-1

### CIVIC SUPPORT ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES (DURING 1966)

#### (1) Mobilized Military Personnel & Equipment

SVC	Description	Unit	Mobilled Military Personnel	Military Army Equipment Used															
				Trk 2 1/2		Trk 3/4		Trk Dump		Bul- dozer		Gra- der		Comp- ressor		Roller		Naval Bus Vess. Other	
				EA	PER	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA	EA
FLD	Total		1,585,020	11,462	106	24,578	10,980	365	299	2,230	86	189	931	8,136					
	Army		1,563,252	10,858	14	24,412	10,533	323	289	2,029	8	-	-	7,628					
	Navy		9,811	407	66	1	15	-	10	--	-	147	931	223					
	AF		7,301	99	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	-	172					
	MC		4,656	98	-	165	432	42	-	201	78	-	-	115					
Construction	Sub-T		387,939	1,759	22	18,628	7,032	318	210	1,834	18	2	-	6,358					
	Army		387,424	1,715	-	18,628	6,956	310	210	1,714	8	-	-	6,342					
	Navy		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
	AF		149	44	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	16					
	MC		366	-	-	-	76	8	-	120	10	-	-	-					
Education	Sub-T		10,176	303	-	356	409	-	10	5	-	17	37	87					
	Army		4,482	234	-	350	396	-	10	5	-	-	-	72					
	Navy		1,742	67	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	15					
	AF		630	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	37	-					
	MC		322	2	-	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					





TABLE A-1 (Cont.)

## CIVIC SUPPORT ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES (DURING 1966)

## (1) Mobilized Military Personnel &amp; Equipment

SVC	Description	Mobilized Military Personnel	Military Army Equipment Used																				
			Unit		Trk 2 1/2	EA	Trk 3/4	EA	Trk Dump	EA	Bul- dozer	EA	Crane	EA	Gra- der	EA	Comp- ressor	EA	Rol- ler	EA	Bus	Vess.	Other
			EA	FA																			
FLD	PER	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA	EA	FA
Agriculture	Sub-T	1,115,611	8,496	59	5,386	3,350	17	79	331	34	34	20	878	1,135									
	Army	1,103,434	8,182	-	5,244	3,087	13	79	310	-	-	-	-	943									
	Navy	3,337	216	59	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	878	192								
	AF	6,236	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-									
	MC	2,604	46	-	141	263	4	-	21	34	-	-	-	-									
Health & Social	Sub-T	61,765	271	21	19	5	-	-	-	-	-	8	15	92									
	Army	60,458	226	14	17	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75									
	Navy	1,104	12	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	16									
	AF	199	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	1									
	MC	4	33	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-									
Social Welfare	Sub-T	9,529	633	4	189	184	30	-	60	34	142	1	406										
	Army	4,454	501	-	173	89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	196									
	Navy	3,628	112	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	141	1	-									
	AF	87	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	155									
	MC	1,360	17	-	16	91	30	-	60	34	-	-	-	115									

Source: Civil AFF, DIV, MND



TABLE A-1 (Cont.)

## CIVIC SUPPORT ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES (DURING 1966)

## (2) Military Materials &amp; Commodities Supported for Civic Action

FLD	SVC	Description	Unit										Medi-	Money	Other	
			Gas	Diesel	Oil	Fuel	Grease	TNT	Wood	cine						
			G/L	G/L	G/L	G/L	Oil	Oil	Oil	Oil	Bag	G/L	IB	m <sup>3</sup>	\$	EA
Total		Total	258,678	1,027,251	6,563	761	11,736	4,000	13,346	20,399	128,887	488				
		Army	256,920	1,002,480	-	-	11,736	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
		Navy	1,294	4,306	5,291	109	-	4,000	4,006	20,399	128,887	29				
		AF	342	933	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
Construction		MC	122	19,532	1,272	652	-	-	9,340	-	-	-	-	-	-	379
		Sub-T	252,818	993,146	-	-	11,736	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
		Army	252,506	991,978	-	-	11,736	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
		Navy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education		AF	195	248	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		MC	117	920	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Sub-T	752	5,154	544	652	-	-	9,340	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
		Army	712	2,642	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Navy	40	1,612	544	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23
		AF	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		MC	-	900	-	652	-	-	9,340	-	-	-	-	-	-	-



TABLE A-1 (Cont.)

## CIVIC SUPPORT ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES (DURING 1966)

## (2) Military Materials &amp; Commodities Supported for Civic Action

Description		Gas	Diesel	Oil	Fuel	Grease	TNT	Wood	Medi-	Money	Other
Unit									ine		
SVC											
FLD		G/L	G/L	G/L	G/L	Bag	IB	m <sup>3</sup>	\$		EA
Agriculture	Sub-T	3,938	22,165	4,571	-	-	-	-	-	-	367
	Army	3,575	7,171	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	325	1,426	4,549	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	AF	42	232	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	MC	-	13,336	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	367
Health & Social	Sub-T	227	735	-	-	-	-	-	4,077	-	31
	Army	72	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	105	650	-	-	-	-	-	4,077	-	-
	AF	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19
	MC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Social Welfare	Sub-T	943	6,051	1,448	109	-	4,000	4,006	16,322	128,887	6
	Army	55	604	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Navy	828	618	198	109	-	4,000	4,006	16,322	128,887	6
	AF	55	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	MC	5	4,376	1,250	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Ministry of National Defense



TABLE A-2

## RESTORATION OF TYPHOON DAMAGE; SARA, 1959

	No. of Dist.	Total Work	Annual Work	Day Work	%	Diesel		D-7	Grader	Officer	En.	Civilian
						Mogas G/L	Oil G/L					
Kwangju	10	-	26,000	650	-	777	18,362	214	42	86	730	-
Jeon nam	5	-	59,450	-	-	162	2,509	68	-	44	193	-
Yeosu	11	-	82,742	-	-	261	4,955	116	-	624	15,966	-
Total	26	20,755	208,372	650	100.80	1,120	25,836	498	42	764	16,809	-
Andong	17	-	88,300	3,209	-	5,832	14,125	266	4	790	12,008	-
Daegu	39	-	102,065	635	-	18,965	10,132	273	108	512	14,961	-
Kyung Buk	25	-	132,481	2,750	-	3,595	12,437	311	80	153	1,968	-
Total	81	300,418	323,376	6,594	100.70	8,088	36,694	880	193	1,428	29,326	100
Ulsan	20	-	111,496	1,870	-	5,970	9,048	279	67	79	2,188	2,712
Kyung Nam	8	-	97,290	2,700	-	13,255	11,637	347	23	78	2,017	467
Milyang	33	-	90,205	2,600	-	6,825	7,620	191	12	45	748	1,280
Changwon	34	-	110,215	3,000	-	3,881	16,785	264	198	339	8,008	-
Total	95	409,456	409,456	1,170	100.00	11,859	45,296	1,081	300	541	12,955	4,402
Total	202	916,629	941,204	8,414	100.27	21,007	107,816	2,459	535	2,733	59,090	4,502

Source: Annual Report of Mil. Engineering (1959)





TABLE A-3

## CIVIC SUPPORT OF ENGINEERS

## (1) Road Development

Area	61	62	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
Wonju-Chooncham	*o26km								
Samduk Cilliery	* 36km								
Suwon-Sampsan	* 4km								
Hongje-Yankee	* 25km								
Honpchon-Chooncham		*26.4km							
Seoul-Chooncham		*47.0km	*76km	o 76km					
		Equip.							
Kuongwonda		Supply	*44km	o 44km					
Cheonan-Yuseong			*60km	o 60km					
Hongchen-Honggeri			*74km	o 74km	0km	o 72km			
Deeku-Deejeon				*158km		o158km			
Seoul Wonju				*105km		o105km	* 8.0km	*13.0km	
Hweungsung-Kwangpheng				*148km		o148km	*16.0km	*10.0km	
Hankyri-Yangyang				* 46km		o 46km	* 7.6km	* 7.0km	*10.0km
Darjen-Nonsan				* 45km		o 45km	* 3.4km	* 1.2km	* 3.4km
Trimt					*12km	* 12km	* 1.0km		*10.0km
Toejen-Kimchon							o17.7km	o10.4km	
Kimchon-Weekwon							o10.0km	o13.2km	
Etc.									

\* Construction and Expansion

o Pavement

Source: ROK Army History (Office of the Chief of Engineers)



TABLE A-3 (Cont.)

## (2) Accomplishment of the ROK-US Joint Highway Project

Des.	(km)	By Year												Remain
		60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70		
Euijungbu-Wonchun	57.0	12	45.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57.0	0.0
Hongchon-Montong	63.0	-	-	-	30.2	16.3	8.0	8.5	-	-	-	-	63.0	0.0
Seoul-Wonju	141.1	-	22.5	42.5	29.3	21.2	25.6	-	-	-	-	-	141.1	0.0
Chun An-Daejeong	60.0	-	-	-	14.2	32.0	13.8	-	-	-	-	-	60.0	0.0
Daejeon-Wae Kwan	127.4	-	-	-	-	-	9.0	39.0	23.5	27.7	28.2	-	127.4	0.0
Seoul-Yaeju	105.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.4	8.0	-	-	9.4	95.6
Kwansan-Airforce Base	12.1	-	-	-	-	-	3.9	2.7	1.9	1.8	-	-	6.7	5.4
Dae Gu City	13.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	4.3	2.9	1.2	13.6	0.0
Buyeo	4.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	3.1	-	-	-	4.8	0.0
Sung Hwan	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	-	2.0	0.0
Daejeon Nonsan	45.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.9	10.9	34.1
Youngchon Pohang	7.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.2	5.2	2.2
No. 391st Road	6.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.5	4.5	2.2
Hamyang City	1.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	1.6	0.0
Kang Neung City	1.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.7	0.4	-	1.1	0.0
Mukho, Jumanjin	2.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	2.2	0.0
Sam Chuck, Buk Pyung	4.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.3	1.2	4.5	0.0
Gimp-Kwang Hwa	5.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	2.7	5.2	0.0
Paju City	3.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.5	3.5	0.0
Choonchon	3.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.0	-	3.0	0.0
Munsan	2.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	2.0	0.0
Total		12	67.5	42.5	73.7	69.5	56.7	51.9	35.1	44.5	42.5	30.8	526.7	



TABLE A-3 (Cont..)

## (2) Accomplishment of the ROK-US Joint Highway Project

Des.	(km)	By Year											Remain	
		60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70		
Seoul-Yeouju	105.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.9	8.6	6.2	13.0	-	45.7	59.3
Hwangsung-Kwang Neang	148.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	8.0	16.4	10.0	-	55.1	92.9
(Expa.) Hankyeri-Yangyang	46.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.1	7.7	7.6	7.0	7.0	36.4	9.6
Daejeon Nonsan	45.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	3.8	3.5	1.2	5.0	19.5	25.5
Dalgung-Nogodan	12.0	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	2.0	2.8	1.0	-	-	6.9	5.1
Total	356.0	-	-	-	-	-	1.1	53.7	30.9	34.1	31.2	12.0	163.6	
Engineer Ed. Committed	1	3.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	7.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.0	35.0	
Material Cost of the U.S. Government:		\$	2,550,000											
Local Material Cost of MND:		\$	62,000,000											
MOC (Budget):		\$	725,000,000											

Source: Office of the Chief of Engineers





TABLE A-4

## THE RESULTS OF CIVIC SUPPORT ACTION DURING VIETNAM WAR

	Result	Military Personnel	Equipments
Road Construction	254km	60,101	7,383
Road Repair	784km	81,312	14,101
Road Pavement	72km	15,734	4,190
Bridge Const.	719km	31,918	3,389

Source: Annual Reports of Engineers

## Civic Sea-transportation Support (Domestic Island and Vietnam)

Year	Material (Ton)	Personnel (Per)
70	206	19
71	43,586	1,033
72	90	--
73	486	6,218
74	3,828	135
75	821	325
76	10	377
77	--	281
78	29.2	--

Source: Headquarters of Navy Department of Education



TABLE A-5

## RESULTS OF INFORMATION ACTION IN REMOTE ISLANDS

	Plan & Executed Island	Residents (Per)	Medical Treatment Times/Per	Various Times/Per	Consolation Play Times/Per	Photo Exhibition Times/Per	Anti-Community Lecture Times/Per	Remote Island Children Invi- tation to Seoul Times/Per	Supports (Times)
1969	40/40	87,135	33 5,650	44 22,579	4 1,737	14 1,190	23 2,190	2 120	40
1970	100/113	591,613	106 31,424	69 53,964	71 44,836	66 22,564	80 50,607	1 120	112
1971	110/133	485,125	117 43,468	87 95,657	16 78,670	106 75,665	101 93,340	1 76	131
1972	100/115	274,039	93 14,832	55 34,030	37 27,460	74 29,596	104 41,280	1 76	
1973	100/102	174,592	92 210,988	63 27,888	41 33,778	60 24,090	92 43,709	1 100	100
1974	100/100	206,600	91 33,940	78 47,650	48 23,110	92 28,481	94 45,415	1 100	100



TABLE A-5 (Cont.)

## RESULTS OF INFORMATION ACTION IN REMOTE ISLANDS

	Plan & Executed Island	Residents (Per)	Medical Treatment Times/Per	Various Times/Per	Consolation Play Times/Per	Photo Exhibition Times/Per	Anti-Community Lecture Times/Per	Remote Island Children Invi- tation to Seoul Times/Per	Supports (Times)
1975	100/103	236,227	102 31,961	100 49,925	100 54,428	100 42,173	100 51,628	1 100	103
1976	100/101	185,768	91 22,166	81 32,249	100 38,886	76 24,855	100 38,061	1 100	100
1977	100/105	56,586	105 12,406	95 28,363	102 31,079	99 26,390	103 31,834	1 100	105
1978	100/112	75,764	107 11,925	111 36,358	108 37,692	110 30,153	112 39,584	1 100	109
1979	100/102	37,431	102 12,227	102 35,138	102 35,138	102 35,138	102 35,138	1 101	102
1980	100/104	25,854	94 7,522	99 24,414	96 28,897	96 24,372	98 28,397	1 100	100
Total	1,140/1,230	2,436,734	1,133 249,509	984 490,215	825 435,711	995 364,667	1,109 508,170	13 1,193	1,211

Source: Headquarters of Navy Department of Education



## TECHNOLOGY AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT AREA

TABLE B-1

STATISTICS OF COMPLETION OF TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL (1961-1975) (UNIT: PER)

Service Details	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Officer	8,567	8,449	11,701	10,702	10,581	9,940	7,314	6,554	6,809	6,508	7,151	7,065	7,678	8,245	1,184
Enlisted Man	6,251	50,142	49,754	48,957	50,758	49,528	38,288	27,634	34,732	48,290	38,301	40,319	38,281	38,107	8,915
Total	14,818	58,591	61,455	59,659	61,339	59,468	45,602	34,188	41,541	54,798	45,452	47,384	45,959	46,352	10,099
Officer	57	155	52	185	197	247	134	307	184	354	98	88	144	132	22
Enlisted Man	1,126	1,199	890	979	1,070	1,097	996	3,091	2,363	2,308	2,317	2,523	3,264	5,394	3,107
Total	1,183	1,354	942	1,164	1,267	1,344	1,130	3,398	2,547	2,662	2,415	2,611	3,408	5,526	3,129
Officer	459	877	1,498	1,727	999	1,473	1,978	1,795	992	1,223	1,121	1,420	739	801	1,139
Enlisted Man	5,735	5,582	6,312	6,052	6,632	5,749	9,056	7,740	5,040	4,824	5,948	4,991	4,020	5,745	6,161
Total	6,194	6,459	7,810	7,779	7,631	7,222	11,034	9,535	6,032	6,047	7,069	6,411	4,759	6,546	7,300
Officer	113	216	334	297	288	480	-	-	-	-	474	-	-	-	-
Enlisted Man	1,391	2,031	2,037	1,907	1,954	3,052	900	-	-	-	6,091	-	-	-	-
Total	1,504	2,247	2,371	2,204	2,242	3,532	900	-	-	-	6,493	-	-	-	-
Officer	9,196	9,697	13,585	12,911	12,065	12,140	9,426	8,656	7,985	8,085	8,844	8,573	8,561	9,178	2,345
Enlisted Man	14,503	58,954	58,993	57,895	60,414	59,426	49,340	38,465	42,135	55,422	52,585	47,833	45,565	49,246	18,183
Total	23,699	68,651	72,578	70,806	72,479	71,566	58,666	47,121	50,120	63,507	61,429	56,406	54,126	58,424	20,528

Source: Micro Film in the Ministry of National Defense





TABLE B-2

## FINISHED OF TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOLS BY SVC &amp; SCHOOL (FOUNDED-1968)

Name of Technical Training School	Nos. of Course	Finished	E.M.		
			Total	Officer	E.M.
<b>Army</b>					
Total	454	571,938	36,089	535,849	
Subtotal	242	497,490	28,285	469,205	
Signal School	57	86,683	800	85,883	
Signal Training Unit	1	13,731	-	13,731	
The Chemical School	9	23,920	9,708	14,212	
F-ROKA Chemical Train. Center	11	18,012	1,446	16,566	
Artillery School	11	22,962	4,083	18,879	
Armored School	8	33,521	818	32,703	
Aviation School	6	4,373	1,103	3,270	
Trans. Train. School	6	26,563	646	25,917	
F. ROKA Trans. Train. Unit	2	73,438	-	73,438	
S. ROKA Trans. Train. Unit	1	11,706	-	11,706	
Medical School	25	24,423	23	24,400	
Q.M. School	10	8,516	-	8,516	
Ordinance School	54	73,376	8,020	65,356	
Engineering School	37	54,663	1,638	53,025	
Signal Training Center	3	15,875	-	15,875	
L.B.C. Driver Train Detachment	1	5,728	-	5,728	
Subtotal	46	21,279	964	20,315	
Navigation School	6	3,841	-	3,841	
Electronic School	2	736	-	736	
Equipment School	4	962	-	962	
Medical School	5	5,020	-	5,020	
<b>Navy</b>					
Engineering School	12	6,186	154	6,032	
Gunnery School	2	374	-	374	
Signal School	3	2,019	-	2,019	
Tactical School	6	1,331	-	1,331	
Worker Educating Center	6	810	810	-	
Subtotal	155	41,485	6,840	34,645	
Technical Train. School	77	19,064	1,097	17,967	
Signal School	55	15,824	1,344	14,480	
Flying School	3	2,000	2,000	-	
The oo Combat Wing	10	2,212	2,212	-	
The oo Combat Wing	1	785	-	785	
The oo Airborne Wing	1	65	65	-	
The oo Rescue Squadron	11	9	9	-	
C.A.C. School	1	16	-	16	
Aero Medical Center	4	1,355	113	1,242	
C.A.C. Technical Train.	2	155	-	155	
Subtotal	11	11,684	-	11,684	
Trans Train. Unit	2	4,710	-	4,710	
Signal Train. Unit	4	5,316	-	5,316	
School	2	1,324	-	1,324	
QM. Equip. Train. Unit	1	189	-	189	
Food-Supplies Train. Unit	1	125	-	125	
Comm Elec Maint Train	1	20	-	20	
<b>M.C.</b>					

Source: MND, Statistics Division



TABLE B-3

## COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF TECHNICAL LICENSES DURING MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND CIVILIAN PART

Dept.	Technician I										Technician II										Assistant Technician										Whole
	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	Sub- total	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	Subtotal	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	Subtotal	Technicians	\$					
Total	27,601	—	54	127	181	305	715	917	3,531	6	158	389	1,875	1,591	2,661	2,266	13,035	126	635	1,101	1,791	1,140	1,025	536	11,035	179,568	15				
Test	278	—	3	29	47	107	61	31	278	—	—	97	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	899	31				
Maintenance	4,658	—	40	62	271	242	240	206	1,061	55	138	210	553	1,114	1,210	210	3,597	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	36,292	13				
Electric	517	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	4	34	37	27	6	5	90	6	31	77	94	101	82	36	427	1,945	27				
Engine	2,423	—	4	2	10	11	—	—	26	6	35	3	93	98	17	—	283	75	330	458	692	559	—	—	2,114	12,322	20				
Oasis	2,259	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	44	67	30	6	6	119	105	388	324	643	370	163	147	2,140	5,154	44				
Subtotal	10,135	—	47	93	328	360	301	237	1,365	62	184	371	770	1,269	1,239	221	4,089	186	749	859	1,429	1,030	245	183	4,681	56,653	18				
Electric	5,491	—	2	6	7	13	18	5	51	4	45	84	399	277	158	123	1,077	96	360	777	1,329	696	407	4,363	42,516	13					
Welding	1,232	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	55	112	70	24	9	306	—	106	161	280	215	126	38	926	5,130	24				
Subtotal	6,723	—	2	6	7	18	5	5	51	4	52	39	511	347	182	132	1,383	96	466	938	1,609	911	824	445	5,289	478,646	14				
Lathe	1,107	—	5	12	16	13	15	10	71	2	33	77	81	96	90	53	394	30	127	124	83	102	111	65	642	23,331	5				
Dangers	8,935	—	—	16	146	273	682	896	2,013	—	52	118	1,248	1,072	2,297	2,076	6,922	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	35,906	25				
Electrical	701	—	—	—	12	6	7	6	31	—	21	—	35	76	92	5	247	—	42	39	99	127	90	26	423	16,072	4				
Instruments																															

Source: Korean Expertise Association



## APPENDIX C

### MEDICAL SCIENCE AREA

#### TABLE C-1

##### ESTABLISHMENT OF RESEARCH INSTITUTE

###### A. THE 1ST NERVES SURGERY DEPARTMENT

The neuro surgery of Korea was in rudimentary stage but it took on the stage of rapid and distinctive development by the foundation of the 1st Neuro-Surgery Team in March, 1952. Then the 3rd Army General Hospital was designated as neuro surgical treatment center and become to conduct a specialized treatment. Many medical officers were trained in the States and on O.J.T. for the treatment of neuro surgical patients. (Sources: Brief History of Army Medical Affairs Vol. 1).

###### B. THE 1ST E.H.F. RESEARCH TEAM

E.H.F., the disease to be generated first in Korea during the Korean war, appeared in the field army area and spread into the whole country in seventies. The Military, to cope with the disease, established and operated the 1st E.H.F. Research Institute and treatment center, arranged cooperatio system with the college hospital, and thereby made turning point in the study on the E.H.F. It took worldwide reputation on this disease. (Source: Brief History of Army Medical Affairs Vol. 1).

###### C. OCEAN AND UNDERWATER MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER

Ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center was found to solve the medical problems of technological development of diving and to study on the prevention against diving accidents and its treatment. It is the unique facilities on the ocean and underwater medicine in Korea. (Sources: Ocean and Underwater Medical Research Center).

###### D. THE AEROMEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER

The Aeromedical Research Center, established in 1952, is the only institute to conduct a study on aeromedical-science aero-staffs' health treatment. The center has issued sscholarly journal "Aeromedical Science" from 1952, and published about 500 articles by this. For the study and





TABLE C-1 (Cont.)

training, it possess many like 'lower pressure chamber', 'human centrifuge', etc. which are the only in Korea. The center conducts physical test and health examination for all civilian pilots and crewmen, and arranged the basis of measuring the throbbing heart and development of the high pressured oxygen machine for the CO poisoning remedy. (Sources: Aeromedical Research Center)

## Accomplishments of Education

	55-70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	77
Aeromedical Officers	321	42	50	51	36	31	34	46	72	71	66	51	871
Aeronurse Officers	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	20	10	10	70
Civilian Pilots	125	102	418	373	363	192	71	70	317	-	-	267	2407
Others	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	29	124

Sources: The Aeromedical Research Center

## E. AEROSPACE AND DIVING NURSING CARE

Armed Forces Nrsing Academy, for the first time in Korea, conducts aerospace and diving nursing education for 68 hours. (Sources: Armed Forces Nursing Academy).





TABLE C-1 (Cont.)

## Medical Equipment Maintenance Training

Year	Officer	N.C.O.	E.M.	Others	Year	Officer	N.C.O.	E.M.	Others
1961	-	-	40	-	1971	-	10	26	5
1962	6	-	79	-	1972	-	-	49	5
1963	6	17	68	4	1973	-	-	78	-
1964	5	11	56	3	1974	-	-	51	-
1965	6	19	71	6	1975	4	5	92	-
1966	6	19	88	1	1976	3	19	44	-
1967	13	20	75	14	1977	2	11	67	16
1968	9	10	51	-	1978	11	-	34	6
1969	-	-	20	-	1979	4	3	51	6
1970	-	20	27	10	1980	3	2	49	3
Total						76	166	1116	80

\* Medical Equipment Maintenance Units is the unique training institute for this part in Korea.



TABLE C-2

## PROJECT FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

## Number of Civilian Patient Treatment

	Domestic				In Vietnam
	Army	Navy	Air Forces	Total	
1966	-	-	-	-	316,508
1967	-	-	56	56	933,664
1968	-	-	163	163	855,805
1969	-	5,650	-	5,650	947,790
1970	-	31,424	-	31,424	623,608
1971	-	43,468	-	43,468	-
1972	98,086	14,832	600	113,518	-
1973	235,072	210,988	-	446,060	-
1974	210,979	33,940	712	215,631	-
1975	255,566	31,961	574	288,101	-
1976	126,471	22,166	2,488	151,225	-
1977	75,340	12,406	5,361	93,107	-
1978	56,608	11,925	5,804	74,337	-
1979	71,136	12,227	7,191	90,554	-
1980	132,084	7,522	9,303	149,909	-
Total	1,261,342	438,509	32,252	1,703,115	3,677,375

Sources: Brief History of Army Medical Affairs, Vol. 1  
 Armed Forces Medical School  
 Naval Headquarters  
 Aeromedical Research Center



# APPENDIX D

## ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TABLE D-1

### MASTER OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES EDUCATION

English																		
Year	Description	Interpretation Officer	Officer's		Balkan Officer	Strategic Information	E.M. Military		Others	Total	Vietnam	Malay	Thai	German	Chinese	Russian	Japanese	Total
			Military English Division	English Division														
1953		326	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	326	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	326
1954		258	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	258	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	258
1955		31	271	-	-	-	-	-	-	302	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	302
1956		-	439	-	-	-	-	-	-	439	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	439
1957		-	344	-	-	-	-	-	-	344	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	344
1958		-	547	-	-	-	-	-	-	547	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	547
1959		-	225	-	-	-	-	65	290	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	290
1960		-	562	-	-	31	-	86	679	-	-	-	-	-	8	6	-	693
1961		-	440	-	-	19	-	25	494	-	-	-	-	-	13	11	-	518
1962		151	216	-	-	48	-	-	415	-	-	-	-	-	11	9	-	435
1963		231	217	-	-	50	-	-	498	-	-	-	-	-	8	10	-	516
1964		39	375	-	-	20	116	-	550	-	-	-	-	10	10	10	-	580
1965		120	273	-	-	19	155	-	567	-	-	-	-	10	9	5	-	591
1966		116	170	-	-	19	192	-	407	-	-	-	-	9	9	5	-	430
1967		119	154	-	-	13	109	-	395	-	-	-	-	15	15	5	-	430
1968		171	161	-	-	20	176	-	528	-	-	-	-	5	14	4	10	561
1969		-	131	-	-	15	108	-	254	127	-	-	-	5	12	5	10	413
1970		214	82	-	-	19	119	-	434	214	19	-	-	9	10	4	10	700
1971		338	142	-	-	20	84	-	554	121	10	19	3	10	5	10	5	732
1972		185	79	18	-	18	156	77	533	56	-	-	-	-	5	-	5	599
1973		298	61	9	-	20	96	-	394	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	10	414
1974		-	87	-	-	20	74	-	181	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	10	201
1975		-	144	-	-	27	52	-	223	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	223
Total		2,477	5,120	27	378	1,347	263	9,622	518	29	19	66	154	79	65	-	-	10,542

Sources: Army Concentrated Administration School



# EDUCATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

Source: Army Concentrated Administration School





TABLE D-3

## CIVILIAN TRUST EDUCATION

	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	Total	Source
Road Official	192	92	114	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	398	Engineer Yearbook
Police	-	-	23	-	-	-	5	58	-	-	31	-	6	113	-	157	150	40	583	Army Communication School
Civilian Defense Personnel	-	-	-	-	23	60	89	90	89	86	87	30	-	229	198	208	209	-	1,400	Army Chemistry School
Defense Industry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	41	15	-	86	Army Communication School
Police Executive	-	-	54	336	-	-	-	-	-	-	103	-	45	-	-	-	-	-	538	Army Infantry School
Service in the First Reserve Executive	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	188	898	1,501	281	49	648	-	3,615	Army Infantry School
Military Instructor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	236	236	240	236	238	218	239	1,643	Army Infantry School
Military Instructor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	26	40	485	46	42	272	231	211	1,379	The Women's Corps
Social Women Trust Education	-	-	-	-	-	417	87	167	329	52	199	1,129	587	460	58	69	-	-	3,554	The Women's Corps
General Women Colleger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	453	893	893	-	130	2,369	The Women's Corps



TABLE D-4

## TRUST EDUCATION THE DOMESTIC CIVILIAN UNIVERSITY

Course		Human Service					Natural Science					
Army		Total	Subtotal	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine	Subtotal	Army	Navy	Airforce	Marine
Year												
1956		11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1957		10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1958		927	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1959	1,183		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1962			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1963			63	32	24	-	6	2	31	23	-	8
1964		50	38	22	6	6	4	12	3	5	4	-
1965		94	59	39	7	10	3	3	24	6	5	-
1966		49	15	13	-	2	-	34	24	5	5	-
1967		58	23	15	3	5	-	35	27	4	4	-
1968		31	15	11	-	4	-	16	4	6	6	-
1969		24	17	10	5	-	2	7	2	5	-	-
1970		41	19	10	5	4	-	22	4	14	4	-
1971		36	20	14	-	6	-	16	4	10	2	-
1972		30	20	14	-	6	-	30	27	-	3	-
1973		52	20	18	2	-	-	32	18	14	-	-
1974		103	49	34	10	5	-	54	21	24	9	-
1975		78	43	32	2	9	-	35	15	10	10	-
1976		60	35	23	2	10	-	25	7	3	15	-
1977		87	50	42	1	7	-	37	10	10	17	-

\*The data during 1956 and 1962 are not available in detail.



TABLE D-5

## OCCUPATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER GRADUATES (1980)

	Administration Management	Emergency Planning	Reserve Army	Technician & Craftsman	Others	Total
Colonel	166	79	10	103	103	461
Lt. Colonel	287	134	54	148	199	822
Major	182	57	103	95	155	592
Captain	39	6	50	51	69	205
Lieutenant	6	-	4	5	2	17
Warrant Officer	22	1	4	72	38	137
Master Sergeant	221	34	25	283	554	1,117
Sergeant First Class	7	1	2	16	-	44
No Reply	1	1	-	-	1	3
Total	931	313	252	763	1,139	3,398

Source: Korea Ex-soldier Association



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